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ToRTS-RIGHT oF UNEMANCIPATED MrnoR TO REcoVER FROM PARENT FOR
lNTENnoNAL TORT-Plaintiff, a child four years of age, was present when her
mother was murdered by her father, defendant's intestate. After keeping plaintiff with the corpse for six days, the father drove plaintiff to his home, where
he committed suicide in plaintiff's presence. Plaintiff brought an action against
the father's estate for shock, mental anguish, and resulting physical injuries,
caused by the father's atrocious acts. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer on the. ground that a minor has no right of action in tort against its
parent. On appeal, held, reversed. A minor may maintain an action against its
parent for wilful, wanton and malicious acts. Mahnke '17. Moore, (Md. App.
1951) 77 A. (2d) 923.
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Until recent years, the unanimous rule in the United States was that an
unemancipated minor could not recover from his parent in a tort action.1 The
reasons traditionally given for the rule were that to allow a child to appear in
court against its parent would disrupt the harmony of the family relationship
and weaken parental discipline,2 and that the child is adequately protected by
the criminal sanctions against abuses of parental authority.3 The rule was applied not only to bar recovery for the parent's negligence or error of judgment,4
but also to protect parents guilty of such intentional wro~gs as false imprisonment, 5 brutal assault, 6 rape, 7 and deceit.8 The harshness of a doctrine which
permitted a parent brutally to assault or wantonly to injure his child and then
plead the sanctity of the home as a bar to the child's recovery has drawn sharp
criticism,9 and in recent years courts have been disposed to re-examine the rule
and to limit its application within reasonable bounds. The trend of current
decisions10 and dicta11 seems to be toward allowing the parent only a qualified
privilege in his relationship to the child, rather than a complete civil immunity.
There is still substantial unanimity in the proposition that a child should not
be allowed to recover from its parent for negligent acts, failure to perform a
parental duty, or excessive punishment not maliciously inflicted.12 But where,

l The rule dates from the leading case of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 S. 885
(1891). Prior to that date no cases seem to have been decided on the point, but the weight
of textual authority was to the effect that an action would lie against a parent who acted
umeasonably or maliciously. PoLLocx, ToRTS 83 (1887); REEVE, LAW OP BARON AND
FEMME 288 (1816); I BLACKST. COMM. 452 (1765).
2 Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E. (2d) 236 (1942); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, ll8 S.E. 12
(1923).
3 Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind.
App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924). It is sometimes further urged that recovery should be
denied because of the depletion of the family exchequer to the detriment of other members of the family, or because of the possibility of "fraud," or eventual inheritance of the
amount of the damages from the plaintiff. However, none of these reasons have been
deemed sufficient to bar property actions between parent and child. Preston v. Preston, 102
Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
4 Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich.
175, 2ll N.W. 88 (1926); Small v. Morrison, supra note 2.
5 Hewlett v. George, supra note I.
GMcKelvey v. McKelvey, Ill Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
7 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
8 Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924).
9 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); PRossER, ToRTS 905 (1941);
McCurdy, "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (1930).
10 Cowgill v. Boock, (Ore. 1950) 218 P. (2d) 445; Meyer v. Ritterbush, 276 App.
Div. 972, 94 N.Y.S. (2d) 620 (1950); Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 9. See also: Fidelity
and Casualty Co. v. Marchand, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 157.
11 Cannon v. Cannon, supra note 2; Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E. (2d)
438 (1938); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. I, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Secure v. Secure,
llO W.Va. I, 156 S.E. 750 (1931).
12 Villaret v. Villaret, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 677; Graham v. l\rliller, 182
Tenn. 434, 187 S.W. (2d) 622 (1945); Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33
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as in the principal case, the parent's acts are so wilful, wanton, or grossly negligent as to indicate a complete abandonment of the parental relation, the modem
trend is to hold that the parental immunity is forfeited, and that the child can
recover in a tort action. In such a case, it can hardly be contended that public
policy favors inllicting an uncompensated injury on the child in order to protect
a family relationship which has already been destroyed by the parent's own act.

William 0. Allen, S.Ed.
(1940). Where the parent is insured, a few courts have permitted the child to recover, on
the ground that the real party defendant is the insurer. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4
S.E. (2d) 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Dunlap v.
Dunlap, supra note 9. However, the majority view is that the presence or absence of an
insurer should have no bearing on the child's right of action. Lasecki v. Kabara, supra this
note; Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W. (2d) 468 (1938); Elias v. Collins, supra
note 4.

